Issue 9

Public systems should expose power—not vulnerable children, families, teachers, and communities.

The Wrong People Are Being Made Transparent

Transparency matters.

That has been one of the clearest messages in this series.

Communities deserve transparency from institutions that hold power:

school boards
state agencies
district leadership
vendors
consultants
policy makers

If people are making decisions that affect children, families, teachers, and neighborhoods, they should expect public accountability.

But that is not always how transparency works in education.

Too often, the people being made most visible are not the people with power.

They are the children.

They are the families.

They are the teachers and staff carrying the strain.

They are the communities already dealing with the consequences.

Missouri DESE’s public data systems show just how broad this reporting has become, with public access to district, school, special education, assessment, education staff, and student characteristic data. The state’s Office of Data System Management also oversees systems tied to reporting, access, and public data.

That is where the line gets crossed.

Because transparency aimed upward can protect the public.

Transparency aimed downward can expose the public.

And those are not the same thing.

When Student Need Becomes Public Identity

Schools collect an enormous amount of information about students and families.

Academic performance.

Attendance.

Behavior.

Economic disadvantage.

Intervention needs.

Disability-related categories in aggregate reporting.

Support services.

Some of that is necessary. Schools need information to deliver services, allocate resources, and meet reporting requirements.

But once that information is aggregated, categorized, and pushed into public-facing systems, it can stop functioning like support information and start functioning like public identity.

A student does not just need help.

They now belong to a district publicly associated with poverty indicators.

A family does not just qualify for assistance.

They now live inside a community repeatedly described through need, risk, and deficiency.

A school does not just serve students with real challenges.

It becomes publicly known as a high-poverty, high-needs, low-performing place.

And that label does not stay on the dashboard.

It follows people.

NCES still uses free and reduced-price lunch eligibility to classify school poverty concentration, including “high-poverty” schools, defined as schools where more than 75 percent of students are eligible. In fall 2021, about 10.5 million students attended high-poverty schools. NCES also notes that FRPL eligibility is widely used as a poverty measure in education data systems.

That may be useful for reporting.

It does not make it harmless for the people living underneath the label.

Public Labeling Does Not Stop With Students

This is not only about students and families.

Teachers are part of this public data story too.

Missouri’s public report card materials include staffing measures such as average teacher salaries, years of experience of professional staff, and advanced degrees. Those measures appear in both report card definitions and state report card views.

On paper, that may look like neutral transparency.

In practice, it can shape public narratives about schools and teachers in ways that are incomplete, misleading, or damaging.

A teacher is no longer just an educator working inside a difficult system.

They become part of a public story about whether a district has enough experience, enough credentials, enough stability, enough “quality.”

A school is no longer just managing vacancies, turnover, or staffing strain.

It becomes publicly marked by staffing weakness.

And once that information is public, it can affect morale, recruitment, retention, and blame.

Again, the pattern holds:

The people carrying the burden of the system are often made more visible than the people who designed it.

The Damage Is Not Abstract

This is not just a policy issue.

It is a human one.

When communities are repeatedly presented through poverty rates, weak outcomes, staffing concerns, and risk indicators, real harm can follow for students, families, and teachers.

Students absorb how adults talk about their schools.

Families absorb the shame that public narratives can create.

Teachers absorb blame for outcomes they do not control alone.

Communities absorb the message that they are being measured, sorted, and categorized more than they are being protected.

That damage can look like:

student stigma
family embarrassment
teacher discouragement
reputational harm to neighborhoods
deficit-based assumptions about children
difficulty recruiting and retaining educators
outsider narratives that reduce people to statistics

Students may never read the dashboard.

Families may never open the report card definitions.

Teachers may never choose what gets posted.

But they still live inside the consequences.

Public Dashboards Do Not Stay in Educational Contexts

Another problem is that school data does not stay inside schools.

Once information is public, it can be viewed and reused by people far beyond educators and families:

journalists
consultants
researchers
political groups
real estate interests
outside critics
community actors with very little context

Federal privacy guidance exists for a reason: education data systems are not simple, and schools operate inside a larger ecosystem of data sharing, privacy rules, and security risk. Missouri’s own department pages describe the statewide longitudinal data structure as supporting reporting, research, and policy analysis.

That does not mean districts are posting private student files online.

It does mean families and educators are often dealing with a much larger information system than they realize.

And once communities are publicly categorized, the real question becomes:

What happens next?

That is the part schools and states rarely explain clearly enough.

When Data Storage Becomes a Safety Issue

This conversation is not just about public dashboards.

It is also about where all of this information lives.

Modern school systems store sensitive information in digital platforms, student information systems, testing systems, HR platforms, communication portals, special education databases, and vendor-managed software.

That means student, family, and staff information is not just collected.

It is stored.

Moved.

Shared.

Duplicated across systems.

And sometimes exposed when those systems are compromised.

The U.S. Department of Education says K–12 cyber incidents include data breaches involving student, teacher, and other school community information, as well as ransomware attacks. Federal student privacy guidance also warns that breaches of educational data can lead to consequences such as identity theft, fraud, and extortion.

That matters because ransomware is not just an IT problem.

It can become a people problem very quickly.

A federal K–12 cyber security fact sheet explains that ransomware attacks can result in class cancellations, school closures, loss of access to curriculum and educational tools, monetary losses, loss of sensitive information, and damage to school community trust.

People may hear that a district was hit by a cyber attack.

They may hear that systems were restored.

They may hear that operations resumed.

What they often do not hear clearly is how exposed information could be reused, whether small-group data could aid re-identification, what reputational harms may follow, or how families and educators are supposed to assess long-term risk.

So yes, the public may hear about the incident.

But not always about the full range of dangers that can follow from it.

And that matters, because safety is not just about getting the server back online.

It is about protecting the people whose lives sit inside those systems.

The Safety Risk Is Bigger Than People Think

When most people hear “school data,” they think:

test scores
attendance
graduation rates
district comparisons

They think accountability.

But safety risks emerge when education data systems make vulnerable people easier to identify, profile, categorize, or target — even when the information is technically legal to publish or share.

That matters because public and semi-public education data can create risk in several ways.

It can make vulnerable communities easier to profile.

It can increase re-identification risk in small schools or narrow subgroups.

It can widen exposure through lawful but poorly understood data-sharing pathways.

And it can create reputational, social, and professional harm even when no individual student or teacher name appears on a dashboard.

In other words, safety is not just about whether someone can view a record.

It is also about whether a system makes it easier for outsiders to sort, stereotype, stigmatize, or target the people inside it.

When Data Becomes a Political Weapon

Public school data does not only shape how communities are perceived.

It also shapes which problems politicians decide to act on.

And often, the problems that get the fastest political response are the ones that are easiest to package.

Missouri enacted a statewide requirement for districts and charter schools to implement policies prohibiting students from using or displaying personal electronic communication devices during the school day beginning in the 2025–26 school year. Governor Kehoe’s office said the policy applies throughout the school day, including class time, meals, breaks, and study hall, with limited exceptions.

That kind of law is easy to explain.

Easy to campaign on.

Easy to present as action.

Phones are visible.

They are frustrating.

They create distractions that teachers and families recognize immediately.

But here is the contradiction.

Even while lawmakers move quickly on visible behavior controls like phone restrictions, the broader education system still leans heavily on school-issued devices, vendor platforms, and compliance-driven technology systems.

Missouri’s literacy law and DESE guidance narrowed local flexibility by tying foundational reading screening to a state-approved assessment framework. DESE’s literacy page directs districts to the state-approved K–3 foundational reading assessment list and Reading Success Plan guidance.

That means districts are not operating in a fully open market.

They are choosing within a smaller state-shaped vendor pool.

And in practice, that does not always mean replacing one tool with another.

It can mean adding a new required product while keeping previous district assessment systems, intervention systems, or technology platforms already in place.

Park Hill’s materials provide one example of how that plays out. District documents show NWEA Reading Fluency being used as a dyslexia screener and foundational reading assessment tool, including district wide implementation and ongoing renewal through the district’s assessment planning and board materials.

So the problem is not that Missouri literally forced every district into one single vendor.

The problem is that the state created a compliance pathway that narrowed district choice into a limited approved market — and districts then had to adopt one of those tools or layer a new one onto systems they were already paying for.

That would be easier to defend if the evidence clearly showed that more devices and more technology consistently produce stronger learning.

But the research does not support such a simple story.

A K–12 review of 1:1 device programs notes that these initiatives can struggle when they focus too heavily on devices and not enough on curriculum and teaching. Another study of a one-to-one iPad program found increased constructivist activity without clear positive effects on math and science achievement.

That is the larger public question politicians and education leaders rarely answer honestly:

If constant personal-device saturation is harmful enough to justify a statewide ban, why does the larger system still keep doubling down on screen-heavy instructional, assessment, and compliance models?

And when the state narrows the compliance path, it does not just influence instruction.

It influences purchasing.

It shapes which vendors gain access to public dollars.

It builds markets around mandates.

Meanwhile, the deeper problems reflected in school data are harder to legislate with a slogan:

teacher shortages
burnout
turnover
mental health strain
poverty concentration
transportation burdens
community instability

Those problems require long-term structural work.

But structural work is slower, less marketable, and harder to campaign on than a simple device ban or a compliance-driven technology requirement.

And that is why data can become a political weapon.

It helps justify highly visible policy responses while the deeper conditions underneath the data remain largely untouched.

Accountability Should Point Upward

If public education wants real transparency, the public should be able to clearly see:

who made the policy
who approved the contract
who profits from the system
who ignored the warning signs
who failed to protect families
who designed the reporting categories
who benefits from public narratives about “high-needs” communities

That is accountability.

Making students, families, teachers, and communities more visible is not accountability.

It is displacement.

It shifts scrutiny away from people with power and toward people already living with the consequences of that power.

Real-World Solutions

Make power transparent, not vulnerable people

Public reporting should focus more heavily on institutional decisions, contracts, funding flows, and leadership accountability than on deficit branding of communities.

Add dignity-based context to public reporting

If community-level student and staffing data is published, it should be paired with context that explains limitations and strengths — not just deficiencies.

Reduce deficit-first labels

States and districts should reconsider whether public-facing terms like “high-poverty” protect children and communities or simply make them easier to categorize.

Improve family and staff notice

Families and educators deserve plain-language explanations of what data is collected, what becomes public, how digital systems store it, and what reporting may mean for long-term risk.

Strengthen cyber security transparency

Districts should explain not just that a cyber incident occurred, but what categories of information may have been affected, what downstream risks exist, and what protections are being offered.

Review downstream harm

Districts and state agencies should evaluate how reporting and digital storage practices affect student dignity, family trust, teacher morale, recruitment, retention, and community reputation — not just compliance.

Call to Action

Ask your district and your state education agency this question:

How are you protecting students, families, teachers, and communities from the harm that can come from public labeling, digital storage, and cyber risk?

Not just how are you reporting data.

Not just how are you meeting compliance rules.

How are you protecting people?

Because children, families, educators, and communities should never be the cost of a transparency system designed without them in mind.

Closing

Transparency matters.

But real transparency should expose power.

It should not expose vulnerable children, families, educators, and communities to labeling, stigma, profiling, and risks they did not create.

Students are not dashboards.

Families are not poverty codes.

Teachers are not staffing metrics to be interpreted without context.

Communities are not reputational collateral.

And sensitive information stored in digital systems is not harmless simply because the public is told the system is secure.

If public education wants to be accountable, then let the spotlight fall where it belongs:

On the institutions, systems, and decision-makers with power.

Not on the people living and working underneath them.

In solidarity,
Lyndsay LaBrier
Merchant Ship Collective
The Education Catalyst

References

Missouri Department of Elementary and Secondary Education. (n.d.). School data. https://dese.mo.gov/school-data

Missouri Department of Elementary and Secondary Education. (n.d.). DESE’s literacy initiatives & efforts. https://dese.mo.gov/college-career-readiness/literacy

Missouri Department of Elementary and Secondary Education. (n.d.). Department offices. https://dese.mo.gov/department-offices

Missouri Department of Elementary and Secondary Education. (2021). Report card definitions. https://dese.mo.gov/sites/dese/themes/dese_2020/mo-viewer/viewer.html?file=https%3A%2F%2Fdese.mo.gov%2Fsites%2Fdese%2Ffiles%2Fmedia%2Fpdf%2F2021%2F12%2FReportCardDefinitions.pdf

National Center for Education Statistics. (n.d.). Concentration of public school students eligible for free or reduced-price lunch. https://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/indicator/clb/free-or-reduced-price-lunch

Office of Governor Mike Kehoe. (2025, July 9). Governor Kehoe signs education and workforce development bills into law. https://governor.mo.gov/press-releases/archive/governor-kehoe-signs-education-and-workforce-development-bills-law

Park Hill School District. (2022–2023). Reading curriculum and instruction. https://www.parkhill.k12.mo.us/news-and-stories/employee-insider-2022-2023/reading

Park Hill School District. (2024). Student achievement report. https://www.parkhill.k12.mo.us/fs/resource-manager/view/bb407faa-0cbc-4139-bc96-58628919dfd3

Park Hill School District Board of Education. (2024). NWEA assessment program renewal. https://boepublic.parkhill.k12.mo.us/com/print_agenda_item.aspx?eId=mCtZdZdDMvA%3D&itemId=24455

U.S. Department of Education. (n.d.). K-12 cybersecurity. https://www.ed.gov/teaching-and-administration/safe-learning-environments/school-safety-and-security/k-12-cybersecurity

U.S. Department of Education, Student Privacy Policy Office. (n.d.). Data security: K-12 and higher education. https://studentprivacy.ed.gov/data-security-k-12-and-higher-education

U.S. Department of Education. (2023). Cybersecurity for K-12 schools and school districts. https://www.ed.gov/media/document/rems-k-12-schools-and-school-districts-developing-cyber-annex-fact-sheet-508c-2023-113278.pdf